




The search for alternatives to litigation is now well-established, with
growing recognition among scholars and attorneys of the inefficiencies of
the traditional court system in dealing with commercial disputes, partic-
ularly those in an international context. Scores of books and articles on
commercial arbitration have been written in recent years, conferences
held, mediation centers established, and a variety of courses offered at
law schools around the world. "Every week another article, every year
another hopeful center, every five years another journal or yearbook"
writes a law professor in the introduction to a journal symposium issue
devoted to a discussion of international commercial arbitration. I The re-
sult of this success of arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) mechanisms in drawing public attention and scholarly interest is
a more extensive experience on which to base an assessment of the
strengths and weaknesses of commercial arbitration.
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This article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration
in an international commercial setting. Part I focuses on the context in
which the decision to arbitrate is made, in particular on the problems
unique to international commercial transactions. Part II evaluates the
potential advantages and disadvantages of arbitration, and compares it to
American-style litigation. Other ADR mechanisms are also briefly dis-
cussed. Finally, the article concludes that the success or failure of an
arbitration is influenced by the aims of the people involved. It should be
remembered that arbitration is a means of resolving disputes, and not of
proving who is right or wrong. A too-aggressive approach to arbitration,
or an adherence to rigid and complex procedural rules-'"Americanizing"
the process-changes the nature of arbitration and jeopardizes its chances
of success. The ultimate question is not primarily one of structuring the
process between the parties but rather, to a substantial extent, one of
engaging the attention of the right decision-makers on each side.
I. Problems Unique to International Commercial Transactions
Some of the factors that contribute to the difficulty and uncertainty of
unplanned dispute resolution are common to all substantial commercial
transactions. They include the high cost of litigation, the significant po-
tential for damage to the underlying commercial relationship, and the
unpredictability of result, which hampers settlement possibilities. Where
the substantial commercial transaction is an international one, however,
new levels of complexity are added.
A. OPPORTUNITY FOR FORUM-SHOPPING AND MULTIPLE PROCEEDINGS
Forum shopping, a concern in the U.S. domestic context, offers entirely
new possibilities for manipulation of a dispute in the international context.
The differences in substantive law, public policy, and procedures in effect
in various countries naturally encourage the parties to a dispute to cal-
culate the advantage to them in selecting one available forum over another,
and often to attempt to bring the dispute before different fora. There are
no universally accepted rules under conflict of laws governing the exercise
of jurisdiction by national courts, and thus the courts of several countries
may be competent to hear a dispute with multijurisdictional contacts. 2
Compounding the initial problem of forum shopping for jurisdictionally
competent courts is a further possible complication. Various jurisdictions
follow different rules in selecting the applicable law to resolve disputes,
2. See V. NANDA & D. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S.
COURTS § 7.01 (4 Int'l Bus. & Law Series, 1986).
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and therefore inconsistent results are possible in different countries or
even in different courts in the same country. 3
The incentive to forum shop and the consequent possibility of several
courts possessing concurrent jurisdiction over the same dispute may result
in litigation proceeding simultaneously in the courts of two or more coun-
tries. 4 In American courts at least, the mere pendency of foreign litigation
is generally not a basis for a stay.5 That added costs and delays are likely
as a result of multiple proceedings, and that the scope for abusive tactics
on the part of counsel is widened, is readily apparent.
B. ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL COMPLEXITIES
Even litigation proceeding in a single jurisdiction is subject to a variety
of procedural complexities that may divert attention and resources from
the central issues of the dispute. This problem is particularly true when
nationals of other jurisdictions are involved. Procedural differences among
the various legal systems provide an added source of confusion and cause
disputes unrelated to the main issues between the parties. The Westing-
house uranium litigation in the late 1970s provides a good example of the
sort of confusion that is generated, and the diversion of attention from
central issues that results, from an injection into the dispute of conflicting
expectations regarding the procedural rules to be followed. 6
Westinghouse sought to establish the existence of an international cartel
among uranium producers that allegedly had brought about an extraor-
dinary increase in the price of uranium. The American lawyers for West-
inghouse, relying on the traditional tools of American pretrial discovery,
sought the assistance of the courts of Australia, Canada, France, South
Africa, and the United Kingdom to compel the production of documents
by the defendants and their employees. Westinghouse was unsuccessful,
largely because of the hostility of the foreign courts to the scope of Amer-
ican discovery procedures. 7 The failed effort cost Westinghouse months
of time and hundreds of thousands of dollars.
The problems caused by varying procedural rules have been recognized,
and efforts made at the intergovernmental level to simplify procedures
3. Id.
4. An excellent example is the parallel proceedings before the courts of both the United
States and the United Kingdom in connection with the dispute between Nelson Bunker
Hunt and British Petroleum arising out of the Libyan nationalization of certain oil conces-
sions. See Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
5. Id.
6. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Contract Litigation, 436 F. Supp. 990 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
7. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No. 232,
[1977] 3 W.L.R. 430, 434-36 (C.A.), quoted in Mehrige, The Westinghouse Uranium Case:
Problems Encountered in Seeking Foreign Discovery and Evidence, 13 INT'L LAW. 19, 22
(1979).
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for service of process and taking evidence in foreign countries. 8 But
procedural differences remain, adding complexity to international disputes. 9
C. THE DIFFICULTY OF ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS
An international dispute is not at an end simply because litigation before
a national court has resulted in a judgment and the parties have exhausted
all appeals. Judgments entered by foreign courts are not entitled to au-
tomatic enforcement by American Courts under the "full faith and credit" 10
clause of the United States Constitution, and foreign courts do not au-
tomatically accord such treatment to judgments rendered by American
courts.II Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments depend on
notions of comity and fairness that are often vaguely and inconsistently
articulated. 12
In the United States the principal defenses to enforcement of a foreign
judgment are lack of jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal, denial of pro-
cedural due process, and contravention of the public policy of the forum
in which enforcement is sought.13 In theory, American courts recognize
the judgments of foreign courts on a basis of reciprocity, although this
requirement has been much criticized and may no longer be the prevailing
rule. 14
Foreign courts tend to be even less willing than American courts to
enforce foreign judgments. The foreign court often asks for assurance
that a comparable judgment rendered by it would be enforced in the United
States, and if this assurance of reciprocity cannot be given, the foreign
court may be unwilling to recognize and give effect to the U.S. judgment.
Many of the same policy considerations that underlie U.S. law relating
to enforcement of foreign judgments also affect Latin American practice
8. Of particular importance in this regard are the Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638,
658 U.N.T.S. 163; and the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, Mar. 18, 1970,
23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
9. See, e.g., Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 107 S.
Ct. 2542 (1987).
10. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
I1. For the policy reasons underlying this difference in treatment, see von Mehren &
Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1606-07 (1968).
12. von Mehren & Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judg-
ments in the United States, 6 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37, 45 (1974).
13. See generally von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1969).
14. The classic statement of the reciprocity rule is contained in Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113 (1895), which remains the leading American precedent on the subject. For analysis
and criticism of the rule, see von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 46-48. Reciprocity
is generally not a condition for enforcement under the UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDG-
MENTS RECOGNITION ACT (1962), 13 U.L.A. 263 (Master ed. 1986).
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in the area.1 5 The law of enforcement of foreign judgments is relatively
uniform throughout Latin America (although important differences exist
among individual countries that must be taken into consideration by the
attorney). Much of the uniformity is due to several important multilateral
treaties, 16 which are quite broad in scope. In the absence of a treaty, the
general Latin American rule is that foreign judgments are given effect
only after formal recognition. 17 Failing formal recognition, a foreign judg-
ment has limited use.
The bases for attack on a foreign judgment are very similar to those
recognized in U.S. law. The Latin American court will consider whether
the original court was jurisdictionally competent to decide the case, whether
the defendant received adequate notice of the action and an opportunity
to defend, and whether the judgment given conflicts with public policy in
the state asked for enforcement. All but a few Latin American countries
required reciprocity, as is in theory required in the United States as well,
in the enforcement of foreign judgments. This reciprocity may be difficult
to establish in the case of a judgment from the United States' 8 because
of the lack of clarity and uniformity in the law.
D. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND ACT OF STATE PROBLEMS;
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Another set of problems that may be connected with an international
dispute arises because of the involvement of governments in activities
which, in the U.S. economy, are essentially private in nature. Most courts,
because of considerations of comity and respect for sovereignty, do not
wish to be asked to challenge the acts of a foreign government. The
doctrines of sovereign immunity and act of state embody this judicial
attitude, which goes back hundreds of years.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity in its modern form precludes na-
tional courts from asserting jurisdiction over foreign governments in re-
spect of activities carried out by the foreign government in its sovereign
capacity, but any commercial activities carried out by the foreign gov-
ernment are not entitled to immunity. Unfortunately the distinction be-
tween "commercial" and "sovereign" activities of a government is far
15. Comment, The Reciprocity Rule and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Latin
America: Trends and Individual Differences, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 213, 213 (1982) (written by
Jeff Larsen).
16. Id. These treaties include, inter alia, the Montevideo Treaty on International Pro-
cedural Law, Mar. 19, 1940, reprinted in 8 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 472-
532 (1949); the Bustamante Code, Feb. 20, 1928, 86 L.N.T.S. III.
17. Comment, supra note 15, at 214.
18. Id; see also von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States,
17 VA. J. INT'L L. 401, 405-06 (1977).
SPRING 1989
192 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
from clear, as a consideration of the activities of state-owned business
enterprises in the nonmarket economies would indicate. Specific sover-
eign immunities legislation in force in the United States' 9 and the United
Kingdom 20 provides some guidance in characterizing a particular activity,
but such legislation is exceptional and there is a need for greater inter-
national uniformity in this area.2 1
Under the act of state doctrine, a U.S. court will refuse to adjudicate
a dispute, even one between American litigants, when such an adjudi-
cation would require the court to look behind the sovereign acts of a
foreign government. 22 Although, as under the sovereign immunity doc-
trine, acts of a commercial character by the foreign government are not
protected from judicial scrutiny, the distinction between "sovereign" and
"commercial" activities is not clear. Enactment of the so-called "Sab-
batino Amendment" 23 has narrowed the field of application of the act of
state doctrine in the United States. The Amendment prevents judicial
abstention based on the doctrine in certain types of cases unless the
President determines that abstention would serve the foreign policy in-
terests of the United States. But the Sabbatino Amendment has been
construed rather restrictively, 24 and the act of state doctrine is still a
complicating factor in the resolution of commercial disputes involving
acts of foreign governments.
Another complicating factor in international commercial transactions,
whether or not a foreign government is involved, is the difference in public
policy from one country to another. Such differences can be substantial,
and may result in, for example, nonenforcement of contract provisions
for reasons completely unrelated to the intent of the parties or even to
the actual fairness of the transaction. These public policies, often estab-
lished through the legislative process, may be obstacles to the recognition
and enforcement of a foreign judgment or arbitral award. As will be dis-
cussed in Part II of this article, public policy considerations are not to
be taken lightly in handling an international commercial dispute.
19. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 289, (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § § 1332(a)(2), (3), (4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982 & Supp. 1).
20. State Immunity Act 1978, ch. 33 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978).
21. See Brower, Bistline & Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in
Practice, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 213 (1979); see also Lacroix, The Theory and Practice of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Untying the Gordian Knot, 5 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW 144 (1987) (discusses the complexities of application of the Act).
22. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
23. Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1013 (1964), (codified 22 U.S.C. § 2730(e)(2)
(1982)) (also known as the Hickenlooper Amendment). For a discussion of the application
of the amendment, see V. NANOA & D. PANSIUS, supra note 2, § 10.06.
24. V. NANDA & D. PANSIUS, supra note 2, § 10.06.
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E. INCREASED COSTS RESULTING FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The final complicating factor to be mentioned here is perhaps the most
obvious: international litigation is made more costly by the need for coun-
sel in more than one country, and by the additional time and travel ne-
cessitated by the distances involved. Multiple proceedings, enforcement
expenses, and additional procedural complexities also create significant
extra costs.
II. Thinking through the Alternatives in a Specific Context
The major sources of difficulty in the resolution of international com-
mercial disputes have been identified above. The discussion of them has
been abstract, divorced from a specific context. But in discussing alter-
native methods of dispute resolution, context must always be considered.
"A method alternative to what?" is the question that supplies the frame-
work for evaluating the advantages or disadvantages of arbitration. The
evaluation of a dispute resolution procedure must also be done in terms
of an objective against which the success of the procedure may be mea-
sured. The objective is to find a means of resolving disputes that is both
fair and reasonably efficient, and that produces a prospect of agreement
in the future.
A. ARBITRATION VERSUS LITIGATION
The term "international commercial arbitration" has no single, unvar-
ying content. This article uses the term to describe all private adjudication
of commercial disputes with international aspects. 25 It should be noted
that the term "arbitration" encompasses both "institutional" arbitration,
administered by organizations such as the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC) or the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and usually
conducted under the rules of that organization, and "ad hoc" arbitration,
administered and conducted in a manner specifically designed by the
parties. In either case, the arbitration agreement may be a provision in
the original commercial contract or may be drafted and agreed to by the
parties after the dispute has arisen.
1. The Potential Advantages of Arbitration Versus Litigation
a. Prevention of Multiple Proceedings
To minimize the risk of multiple proceedings with potentially inconsis-
tent results, the parties to a transaction should select in advance a single,
25. This is the definition supplied by Smit, The Future of International Commercial
Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9 n. I (1986).
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mutually agreeable forum for dispute resolution. The choice should be
made with careful attention paid to whether the chosen forum will in fact
exercise jurisdiction, and whether the forum selection will be recognized
and enforced by other possible alternative fora, without a need for further
proceedings.
The prevention of multiple proceedings has been helped by the sub-
stantial progress in the development of an institutional and legal frame-
work for arbitration that is in many respects more highly developed than
the international judicial process. The United Nations Committee on In-
ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has developed a set of rules of ar-
bitration, 26 which, together with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration
of the ICC, 27 are widely accepted internationally for use in all but the
most specialized kinds of commercial disputes. The International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) administers its own set of
rules, as does the AAA and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA).28
The enforcement of arbitral awards has been the subject of intergov-
ernmental effort as well, with a large number of countries becoming par-
ties to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 29 commonly known as the "New York Con-
vention." Under the convention it has become much easier both to compe 30
arbitration to the exclusion of parallel judicial proceedings-reducing if
not eliminating the possibility of forum shopping-and to enforce an award
once it has been obtained. 31
26. Report of the United Nations Committee on International Trade Law, 31 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 17, Doc. A/31/17, at 33 (1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976).
27. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. L. No. 291, ICC 9-21 RULES FOR
THE ICC COURT OF ARBITRATION (1980).
28. CMEA countries include Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Re-
public, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and
Vietnam. Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Arbitration Courts at the Chambers of Com-
merce of the CEMA Countries dated Feb. 28. 1974, reprinted in, 4 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW
433 (1986). Professor Smit argues that "the needs of international intercourse cannot ef-
fectively be served by the rapidly increasing number of international arbitration institutions
with different rules and processes" and he proposes the creation of a single international
institution. Smit, supra note 25, at 29.
29. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. With the accession of
the Peoples' Republic of China on Jan. 22, 1987, the Convention now has seventy-two
signatories.
30. The Convention requires the courts of a state party to it to refer the parties to
arbitration except where the agreement to arbitrate is "null and void, inoperative or incapa-
ble of being performed." See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J.
1049, 1063-64 (1961).
31. See generally Harnik, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 31
AM. J. COMp. L. 703 (1983).
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Another international convention regarding the enforcement of arbitral
awards is of importance in Latin American countries. The Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 32 combines ele-
ments of an earlier draft convention 33 and the New York Convention.
While it differs from the New York Convention in some respects, it seeks
the same objectives in similar ways. 34 Both conventions deal with the
issue of enforcing an arbitral award. The Inter-American Convention fol-
lows the New York Convention in limiting the grounds on which a party
can object to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award by putting the
burden of proof on the party opposing enforcement to prove the defec-
tiveness of the award. 35 Thus far ten countries have ratified the Inter-
American Convention, and seventeen have signed it.36 The United States
Senate gave its consent to ratification of the Inter-American Convention
on October 9, 1986. Congress must now adopt implementing legislation.
It is being urged to do so by many interested groups, among them the
American Bar Association and the AAA. 37
b. Insulation from the Application of National Public
Policies Extrinsic to the Intentions of the Parties
Prior to agreeing on a forum for dispute resolution, the law of any forum
under consideration should be reviewed to ensure that public policies of
the forum will not interfere with enforcement of the agreement as intended
by the parties. If unintended application of national public policies cannot
be avoided through choice of forum (as when the government of one party
imposes sanctions on that party for violation of national laws), thought
should then be given to an agreement on remedies enforceable in the
chosen forum that would permit equitable adjustments to the relationship.
An aspect of commercial arbitration that may be an advantage or a
disadvantage, depending on the context in which it arises, is that arbitra-
tors are generally much less likely than national courts to entertain claims
or defenses alleging violation of regulatory laws grounded on considera-
tions of public policy rather than of equity between private parties. Ar-
bitrators have no public policies extrinsic to the agreement of the parties
that they must enforce. 38 Arbitrators are thus more likely than courts to
32. Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. A/20 (SEPF), reprinted in
14 I.L.M. 336 (1975).
33. Draft Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Oct. 5, 1967, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser. I/VI., at 48.
34. Nattier, International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: Enforcement of
Arbitral Agreements and Awards, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 397, 402 (1986).
35. Id. at 403.
36. INT'L ARB. REP., Aug. 1986, at 589.
37. Nattier, supra note 34 at 405; see also INT'L ARB. REP. Apr. 1987, at 239.
38. Higgins, Brown & Roach, Pitfalls in International Commercial Arbitration, 35 Bus.
LAW. 1035-40 (1980).
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apply the law selected by the parties regardless of any choice-of-law
principles that might prevent such application under the laws of the place
of arbitration. 39
In part for this reason, many national legal systems treat as nonarbitra-
ble certain kinds of disputes having a high public-policy content. Never-
theless, in the landmark case of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 4° the United
States Supreme Court held that a claim involving alleged violation of the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws could not be brought before
the courts where the underlying agreement 'was "truly international in
character" and included an arbitration clause. 41 The decision in Scherk
stands for the proposition that, in light of the strong policy favoring in-
ternational arbitration embodied in the New York Convention, issues that
would be nonarbitrable domestically may be arbitrable when the under-
lying transaction is "truly international" in character.
The recent United States Supreme Court case of Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.42 held that claims arising under
the Sherman Antitrust Act are arbitrable in the context of an international
distributorship agreement. The Supreme Court rejected the public policy
concerns raised by a lower court to justify precluding arbitration of an-
titrust claims in international business disputes. The Court warned, how-
ever, that "in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses
operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue
statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation
in condemning the agreement as against public policy." 43 The Court thus
was careful to preserve the role of American courts in protecting parties'
rights to assert antitrust and perhaps other statutory claims. 44 An Amer-
ican court could at the enforcement stage vacate an award for failure of
the arbitral tribunal to address and resolve antitrust claims.
The greater latitude afforded arbitrators in avoiding application of na-
tional public policies is illustrated by a pair of cases decided in France. 45
In both cases the Paris Court of Appeals held that, because of the non-
French character of the awards, it lacked jurisdiction to hear challenges
39. See generally Croft, The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration:
Is It Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16 INT'L LAW. 613 (1982).
40. 417 U.S. 506 (1975).
41. Id. at 515.
42. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
43. Id. at 637 n. 19; see also O'Neill, Recent Developments in International Commercial
Arbitration: An American Perspective, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 7, 9 (1987) (discussion of Mitsubishi).
44. O'Neill, supra note 43, at 11.
45. See generally Craig, Park & Paulsson, French Codification of a Legal Framework
for International Commercial Arbitration: The Decree of May 12, 1981, 7 Y.B. COM. ARB.
407, 409-10 (1982).
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to two arbitration awards rendered in Paris under ICC rules. Libyan Gen-
eral National Maritime Transport Co. v. Gotaverken Arendal AB 46 and
AKSA v. Norsolor47 led to amendments to the sections of the French Code
of Civil Procedure dealing with arbitration designed to ensure, among
other things, that awards rendered in international commercial arbitrations
would not be invalidated on grounds of conflict with French internal (as
opposed to international) public policy.48
As the number of disputes declared nonarbitrable by national legal
systems decreases, arbitration clauses become more attractive as a way
of avoiding the application of national public policies extrinsic to the
intentions of the parties. This may reduce the likelihood of one of the
parties using spurious claims under laws such as the United States se-
curities and antitrust statutes to avoid arbitration or to apply pressure for
a favorable settlement.
c. Procedural and Other Flexibility
One of the cardinal features of arbitration is its flexibility. American
lawyers, accustomed to detailed rules of procedure and evidence, may be
uncomfortable with that flexibility, but to the extent parties to a trans-
action are willing to devote the time and effort required, they may develop
a structure that meets their needs more closely than the traditional liti-
gation system is able to do.49 The lack of elaborate pre-hearing discovery
and the general informality and nontechnical nature of evidence intro-
duction minimizes the opportunities for procedural maneuvers that have
little to do with the central issues of the case but that have the potential
to cause a great deal of delay, confusion, and expense. Foreign companies
in particular, wary of dealing with American lawyers, discovery, depo-
sitions, and pretrial examinations, may greatly prefer the relative pro-
cedural simplicity of arbitration. 50
The ability of the parties to select arbitrators who are well-equipped to
deal with the issues specific to their dispute is a principal element of
flexibility in arbitration. Arbitrators need not be lawyers, and the common
use of panels of arbitrators permits the inclusion of technical as well as
46. The decision is published in 1980 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 524. An English translation
is attached to Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of its Country
of Origin, 30 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 358 (1981).
47. Published in 1981 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 306. An English translation was published
in 20 I.L.M. 887 (1981).
48. Decree No. 81-500, dated May 12, 1981, inserts two new titles (V and VI), com-
prising arts. 1492-1507, into Book IV of the New Code of Civil Procedures.
49. Fox, Dispute Resolution Techniques in International Contracts Involving the Sale
of Goods, 15 INT'L Bus. LAW 259, 260 (1987).
50. Aksen, The Need to Utilize International Arbitration, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
11, 13 (1984).
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legal experts. 5 1 Company management may be involved as arbitrators,
offering them the chance to participate in resolving the dispute to an
extent not possible with traditional litigation, where management typically
defers to legal counsel. Arbitrators may be chosen in advance of a dispute,
allowing both parties to avoid the anxiety accompanying the appointment
of a decision-maker unfamiliar to them and of unknown ability and
impartiality.
d. Confidentiality
Arbitration does not generally involve discovery as extensive as that
afforded in U.S. judicial proceedings. This may be an advantage to a party
concerned about, for example, the disclosure of trade secrets. Moreover,
arbitral awards are themselves confidential and not matters of public rec-
ord, which lessens the risk of public disclosure as a result of the pro-
ceedings.52 The greater confidentiality afforded by arbitration may in itself
be a goal of the parties involved, who may prefer to shield their business
dealings from competitors and the public. It may also be valued as a
means of protecting an ongoing commercial relationship from possible
harm due to a publicized dispute.
Of particular concern to the corporate planner should be preservation
of the underlying commercial relationship. Long-term contractual and
other legal relationships in international commerce are increasingly prev-
alent, lending urgency to the need for procedures that will allow parties
to resolve a dispute without destroying their business relationship and
the goodwill necessary to it. If business people withdraw from the dispute
resolution process and leave their lawyers to engage in a "win-lose"
contest, damage to the commercial relationship is likely. A prime objective
of the planner should be to involve in the dispute-settlement process those
business people aware of and committed to the importance of settling
differences while maintaining as much as possible an affirmative atmo-
sphere for continuing the business relationship. This atmosphere may
require for its preservation the confidentiality afforded by arbitration.
The confidentiality of arbitral proceedings may be an added advantage
when a government agency is a party to the dispute. Government ac-
countability to the public and the consequent concern with public opinion
51. Smit, supra note 25 at II & n. 10.
52. Arbitration awards are not invariably confidential. On Sept. 16, 1987, the AAA.
under whose auspices the recent IBM-Fujitsu arbitration was concluded, placed advertise-
ments in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal announcing the decision of the
arbitrators and summarizing its terms, and offering a packet of materials relating to the
decision. IBM and Fujitsu obligated themselves not to discuss the award, but gave their
permission to the AAA to disclose its terms.
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may prevent the agency from settling a case or taking a position in liti-
gation that, while otherwise reasonable, would attract unfavorable press
and public attention. A government agency may have to analyze the case
from a public relations standpoint, a possible hindrance to rational set-
tlement of the dispute. The confidentiality of arbitration would allow ne-
gotiations to be conducted in private, and should greatly reduce the
possibility of public scrutiny influencing the process.
e. Value of Informal Proceedings
The final advantages of arbitration to be discussed in this article are
perhaps less easily recognized and measured than those mentioned above.
The relatively informal nature of arbitration produces several important
benefits. Informal proceedings not burdened by detailed and inflexible
rules of procedure may lessen the tension surrounding a dispute and in
that way alone facilitate a solution. And in certain cultures in particular,
arbitration may provide a "face-saving" approach to dispute resolution. 53
So much prestige may have been invested in advocating one's own po-
sition in a dispute that it becomes impossible to move closer to the other
party's position in negotiations save in an environment mediated by a
third person. This environment allows those who may hope for a settle-
ment (but who do not wish to appear to be the supplicant) a graceful
retreat from an intransigent position. Even aside from concerns over the
impartiality of the forum, cultural differences may make one party feel
out of its element in the courts of another party. And in some cultures
the courts are not where business is done anyway.
Finally, the informal nature of arbitral proceedings allows room for the
participation of corporate management. Often only onlookers to litigation
battles dominated by their lawyers, in arbitral proceedings management
may have an active role in defining the issues and structuring a solution.
Involvement of senior management in attempts to resolve disputes has
several beneficial results. First, the managers are exposed to the argu-
ments and perspective of the other side to the dispute, allowing them to
assess more realistically the merits of their own position, and the possi-
bilities of settlement. Second, management participation helps ensure that
the dispute will be viewed from a commercial perspective with the ultimate
goal being a mutually satisfactory solution rather than the complete vin-
dication of one position or another. And finally, the involvement of senior
management seems likely to increase the chances for reestablishment of
a good commercial relationship between the parties.
53. Fox, supra note 49, at 260.
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2. Potential Disadvantages of Arbitration Versus Litigation
Arbitration is far from universally praised. Even those who ultimately
find much to value are not uncritical. 54 The disadvantages of arbitration
in many cases result from the same attributes that give rise to its advantages.
a. Problem of Multiple Proceeding
It should be noted that the attempt to use arbitration to avoid multiple
proceedings may backfire. The traditional litigation system is better-
equipped to deal effectively with disputes involving more than two parties.
In products liability cases, for example, impleader is available to join
those who should be party to the litigation.
An international commercial transaction often involves more than two
parties. Construction contracts, for example, are particularly likely to
present difficulties, involving as they do many parties-a contractor and
many subcontractors, employees, banks, insurers, and so on. 55 Even a
relatively simple sales contract may involve, in addition to the buyer and
seller, brokers, insurers, transport agents, and bankers. Any dispute that
arises is likely to involve several of the parties, as the original disputants
attempt to pass responsibility to others. The multiparty business dispute
is in many ways a new phenomenon to which little attention has been
paid in the past, and for which little provision has been made in existing
arbitration rules. 56 Problems may arise where several parties have signed
the same contract. Existing arbitration rules provide a method of appoint-
ing arbitrators where there are two disputants, but not where there are
three or more. Or a dispute may arise under one contract and lead to
further disputes under other contracts. The parties to each contract will
be prepared to arbitrate with each other, but not with "outside" parties. 57
The traditional court system is able to accommodate multiparty disputes
with relative ease, being equipped with well-developed rules on joinder
of parties. Existing arbitration rules have no such mechanism, necessi-
tating a careful working out in advance of methods of dealing with mul-
tiparty disputes. A party could protect itself against the multiparty problem
by negotiating in each related contract arbitration clauses authorizing
consolidation; by application for arbitral consolidation to a national court;
54. See generally Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Rhodes & Sloan, The Pitfalls of International Commercial
Arbitration, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19 (1984).
55. Devitt, Multiparty Controversies in International Construction Arbitrations, 17 INT'L
LAW. 669 (1983).
56. This is the opinion of the Institute of International Business Law and Practice,
founded by the ICC, as expressed in the report of its first annual meeting, PUB. No. 359,
MULTIPARTY BUSINESS DISPUTES, ICC 12 (1980).
57. Id.
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by entering into a submission agreement with the concerned parties pro-
viding for consolidation; or by operation of the rules of an international
arbitration institution (however, the rules of most of the major interna-
tional arbitration associations do not provide for consolidation). 58
United States law seems clearly to permit consolidation of arbitration
proceedings in the absence of specific party agreement, 59 but the law of
leading European arbitration centers is either adverse or unsettled. 60 The
Institute of International Business Law and Practice of the ICC urges
recognition of the multiparty problem in international arbitration. The
Institute suggests that it is preferable to have a multiparty business dispute
decided by a single arbitral tribunal, and that this should be achieved by
agreement of the parties or by suitable provision in the rules of arbitral
institutions. 6 1 With respect to those countries that have become parties
to the New York Convention, problems of enforcement of arbitral awards
have now been largely eliminated as far as international commercial ar-
bitration is concerned. However, there still remain a number of com-
mercially important countries not yet party to the Convention, with
resulting doubts as to the enforceability in the courts of those countries
of arbitral awards rendered elsewhere, and vice versa. Courts tend to be
hostile to any effort by private parties to oust them of jurisdiction. Some
legal systems, while recognizing the validity of arbitration agreements and
awards, have discriminated in various ways against foreign as opposed to
domestic awards. 62 Enforceability problems may result in multiple pro-
ceedings that would have been unnecessary in a traditional litigation setting.
b. Impact on Substantive Rights
Resort to arbitration may affect the substantive rights and duties of the
parties in a manner not originally contemplated. For example, in forcing
defendant Soler Chrysler-Plymouth to arbitrate even its allegation of an
antitrust violation on the part of Mitsubishi Motors, the Supreme Court
may have effectively changed the balance struck in the distributorship
agreement between the parties. The antitrust protections of American law
may have been relied upon, then effectively withdrawn with the command
to arbitrate.
Arbitration may also affect the substantive rights of the parties in the
area of preliminary relief. American courts have split on the question
whether the New York Convention precludes the granting of pre-award
58. Devitt, supra note 55, at 671, 674.
59. Id. at 673, citing the applicability of FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (authorizing consolidation)
to proceedings under the Federal Arbitration Act.
60. Id.
61. Institute of International Business Law and Practice, supra note 56, at 21.
62. Quigley, supra note 30, at 1051.
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attachments or other preliminary relief, 63 although it does seem clear that
such relief is available to the extent that it is demonstrably consistent with
the intent of the arbitration agreement. Commentators are split on this
issue as well. Some see the necessary involvement of national courts as
undermining the purpose and effect of the Convention, while others be-
lieve that preliminary relief is an effective means of enforcing an arbitral
award. 64
The principal international rules of arbitration specifically permit either
party to apply to a court for interim relief. 65 In the absence of such a
provision the parties may well be required to seek interim relief from
arbitrators rather than the courts. These awards may under the New York
Convention be enforceable in the courts; however, the delays involved
in appointing the arbitrators and then obtaining the interim award may
make the issue moot. There may also be doubts whether an arbitral award
will adequately deal with, for example, the problem of trade secrets vi-
olations, where injunctive relief would seem the best remedy. The ability
of arbitrators to order nonmonetary awards and ensure their enforceability
is needed to enhance the utility of arbitration in a variety of disputes.
c. The Risk of Creating a Defective Structure
Unlike ajudicial proceeding, commercial arbitration does not take place
within a framework of well-defined rules on such matters as pre-hearing
proceedings, submission of documents to the tribunal, presentation of
issues prior to the hearing, use of expert witnesses, and so on. 66 In
addition, except where well-developed rules such as those of the ICC or
UNCITRAL are used, the parties must make detailed arrangements re-
garding procedures for appointment of arbitrators, replacement of arbi-
trators where necessary, submission of pleadings, entry of awards,
allocation of costs, and enforcement of awards.
The foregoing matters are regulated by agreement of the parties, and
that agreement is generally entered into as part of a commercial agreement
63. Compare I.T.A.D. Assoc. v. Podar Bro., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981) with Atlas
Chartering Serv. v. World Trade Group, 453 F. Sapp. 861 (S.D.N. Y 1978); see also Note,
Pre-Avward Attachment Under the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 785 (1981).
64. Rhodes & Sloan, supra note 54, at 34.
65. Article 26(3) of the UNCITRAL Rules provides as follows: "A request for interim
measures addressed by any party to a judicial authority shall not be deemed incompatible
with the agreement to arbitrate, or as a waiver of that agreement." [1976] VII UNCITRAL
Y.B. (part 1) 22, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976). See also article 8(5) of the ICC Rules.
66. For an outline of the procedural issues which should be addressed in drafting an
arbitration agreement or terms of reference, see McClelland, International Arbitration: A
Practical Guide for the Effective Use of the System for Litigation of Transnational Com-
mercial Disputes, 12 INT'L LAW. 83 (1978).
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to which the arbitration clause is only a very small and ancillary part. It
often happens then that most of those issues must ultimately be decided
in the absence of contractual provisions, which increases the likelihood
that the time and resources of the parties will be diverted from the central
issues in the dispute. There is also then a greater risk of drafting a "path-
ological" clause, which will fail of its purpose if ever tested in a dispute.
The greater procedural and other flexibility offered by arbitration was
discussed above as an advantage. The risk attaching to this flexibility,
however, is that the parties may attempt to draft an arbitration clause
that mirrors in its detail and complexity the rules governing a United
States District Court. Flexibility is only helpful if advantage is taken of
its availability.
The flexibility offered by arbitration has a price. Judicial fora have the
advantage, at least in most countries, of being provided and paid for by
government rather than by private litigants utilizing their services. In
contrast, the forum costs of an arbitration must be defrayed by the parties
to the arbitration. The expenses involved include the fees and expenses
of the arbitrator or arbitrators. Since arbitrators tend to be experienced
commercial lawyers or technical people, their expenses obviously are not
small. Where the parties use institutional as opposed to ad hoc arbitration,
the expenses include administration fees charged by the institution in
question. 67
d. Discovery Narrower in Scope
The narrower discovery permitted in arbitration may prevent arbitrators
from being able to compel the production of documents or the presentation
of witnesses for deposition. While this restriction may be an advantage
in some cases, it may also hinder fact development and lead to unjustified
results. 68
Lack of discovery may be a disadvantage to the extent that one is
comparing arbitration to the U.S. litigation system, with its well-devel-
oped discovery rules. But in arbitration, precisely because the parties do
not have the tools to compel discovery, an arbitrator may draw inferences
from a failure to produce certain evidence. An arbitrator will be free to
67. The high cost of institutional arbitration has been much criticized. Fox, supra note
49, at 260 (citing Lyons, Arbitration: The Slower, More Expensive Alternative? AM. LAW.
107 (Jan./Feb. 1985)). Arbitral institutions have responded to concern over costs. The ICC,
for example, in 1986 announced changes in its fees schedule capping a formerly open-ended
scale for administrative charges, and staggering the payment of advances on costs (formerly
payable in total in advance). Memorandum from Stephen Bond, Sec. General of the ICC
Court of Arbitration (July 1, 1986).
68. Ehrenhaft, Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 9 LAW & POL' INT'L
Bus. 1191, 1207 (1977).
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draw adverse inferences from nonproduction of evidence, where a trial
court judge would rely on the rules of discovery to reveal pertinent evi-
dence. This observation has a counterpart in the court system too. A
French court, for example, would be more willing to draw inferences from
a lack of evidence than a U.S. court would be, again because of the
different availability of discovery mechanisms.
B. ALTERNATIVES OTHER THAN ARBITRATION
Alternative procedures can be structured in many ways. The particular
structure chosen will depend on the nature of the dispute, whether for
example it involves technical issues or questions of fact, and on the legal
framework within which the structure will be established. This section
will summarize briefly the principal variations that have been suggested. 69
1. Nonbinding Procedures
Nonbinding procedures are designed to be purely advisory. They are
independent of any formal proceedings either pending or subsequent, and
no statements or conclusions made at or arising from the procedures may
be used as evidence in formal proceedings. Nonbinding procedures may
take several forms:
a."Mini-trial" with Neutral Advisor
Used in the TRW/Telecredit dispute and in the multimillion dollar con-
tract case between the Wisconsin Electric Power Company of Milwaukee
and the American Can Company of Greenwich, Connecticut, this pro-
cedure involves a structured presentation to business executives of the
disputing parties and a neutral advisor. The executives, aided by the
advisor, then consider possible resolutions of the dispute. 70 If the dispute
is not settled at this stage, the next step is for the neutral advisor to render
an opinion as to the probable outcome of the dispute if it were to proceed
to trial. Prior agreement of the parties would usually prevent this opinion
from being put into evidence at any subsequent trial.
b. Confidential Mediation or Conciliation
In this procedure, the neutral advisor acts as confidential go-between
for the parties and conducts a kind of shuttle diplomacy. The idea is that
the parties will communicate negotiating positions and concerns to the
69. The list of possibilities set forth is based in substantial part on the variations sug-
gested by Eric Green. See Green, The Mini-Trial Approach to Complex Litigation, in
CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, DISPUTE MANAGEMENT I-A.1 (looseleaf 1981).
70. For an account of the Wisconsin Electric mini-trial, see Lempert, Two Companies
Find Big Promise in Little Trial, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 24, 1983, at 48.
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intermediary who will attempt to structure a solution acceptable to both
sides. Again, it appears necessary that the parties agree to preserve the
confidentiality of this process and agree not to introduce any portion of
the discussions in evidence in any subsequent formal proceedings.
c. Contingent Settlement Agreement
Really a negotiating structure, this variation involves attempts by the
parties to reach agreement as to the monetary amounts that would be
owed assuming several possible outcomes at trial. The theory is that by
quantifying their potential exposures and recoveries the parties will nar-
row the range of possible outcomes and thus enhance the probability of
arriving at a compromise.
2. Semi-Binding Procedures
Semi-binding procedures, while not a part of formal proceedings, are
related to them in a way that gives them more "teeth" than the nonbinding
procedures discussed above.
a. "Mini-trial" with Penalties
One option would be the use of a "mini-trial" like that used in the
Wisconsin Electric Power Company case, with the added element of a
stipulated penalty to be paid by the party whose position is rejected by
the neutral advisor if that party refuses to accept the neutral advisor's
opinion and then loses in the ensuing formal proceedings. Apart from this
penalty, however, the neutral advisor's opinion is strictly advisory.
b. "Mini-trial" with Proceedings Admissible
This variation, similar to the procedure used in the Wisconsin Electric
Power Company case, contemplates a "mini-trial" before a neutral ad-
visor with the advisor's opinion admissible by either party in subsequent
formal proceedings. The advisor's opinion would not be conclusive but
would carry probative weight.
3. Binding Procedures
Under a binding procedure the parties would agree to give conclusive
effect to the outcome of the alternative proceeding, to the extent implicit
in the procedure selected.
a. "Mini-trial" before Special Master
One type of binding procedure would involve the conduct of a "mini-
trial" before a referee or special master appointed by a court having
jurisdiction over the dispute. The parties would presumably have to limit
discovery and narrow the issues in advance, with the approval of the
overseeing court. Conclusions of law by the special master would be
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subject to review by the court under the applicable rules of procedure,
while findings of fact would be conclusive on the parties.
The proceedings before the special master would provide for partici-
pation by senior management of both parties and for periods of consul-
tation and would thus attempt to achieve the objectives of alternative
procedures within a court-supervised context.
b. Modified Arbitration
Where the parties conclude the arbitration agreement after the dispute
has arisen, it is usual to draw up "terms of reference" defining issues to
be resolved and procedures to be used. The parties may draft the terms
of reference in whatever way they consider appropriate. Under this vari-
ation the parties would be foreclosed from challenging the arbitral award,
either as to findings of fact or conclusions of law, except through one of
the defenses permitted under applicable domestic law, and where also
applicable, the New York Convention.
III. Conclusion
The alternatives to litigation discussed above are in the end simply
different mechanisms for achieving the same result: directing the attention
and engaging the energies of business people toward resolving the dispute.
The value of the alternative procedure selected may be measured in terms
of its success in structuring management participation in dispute resolu-
tion. Such participation offers the best chance for a realistic assessment
of the parties' respective positions, and thus ultimately the best chance
for a timely, equitable, and beneficial settlement of the dispute.
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